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NOTES
The Right to be a Recalcitrant Union Member
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court considered the problem
of union discipline in the case of Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB. 1 The
Court clearly stated that the policy of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) insures the right of each employee who chooses to join a
union to be a "good, bad, or indifferent" member. 2 Although the
validity of this phrase seems to be generally accepted, 3 it has never been
enforced as an affirmative right. The purpose of this Note is to analyze
the embryonic right to be a recalcitrant union member. Since most
studies have examined this area in terms of the validity of union
discipline against the member,4 this Note will necessarily assume a
different approach. The question is what affirmative rights does a
member have to subvert union authority. In order to examine this
question more thoroughly, the scope of this Note will be limited to an
analysis of the legal developments in two areas: 5 (I) union restrictions on
employee production; and (2) union discipline for filing with the NLRB.6
Following this analysis, decisions of both the NLRB and the courts will
be examined to determine the existence and scope of the right to be a
recalcitrant union member.
I.

A.

PRODUCTION QUOTAS

Development of the Law Prior to Scofield

In 1947, the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)
amended section 7 of the Wagner Act by granting employees the right to
1. 347 U.S. 17 (1954) (unions cannot enforce fines against members by reducing seniority).
2. Id. at 40.
3. This language was quoted with approval in Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 429 n.5
(1969). The Scofield Court, however, qualified the phrase to permit unions to discipline its
members. Id. See Brief for Petitioner at 23, Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
4. E.g., Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline Under the Landrum-Griffin Act, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 727 (1969); Kovarsky, Union Discipline, 19 LAB. L.J. 667 (1968); Summers, Legal
Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (1951); Summers, The Law of Union
Discipline: What the Courts Do In Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175 (1961); Symposium, Union and Its
Membership, 21 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 335 (1968).

5. There are many available courses of action that a union member may employ to undermine
the union's authority. One which will not be discussed in this Note is the refusal of a member to
participate in an economic strike. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
6. This area is a 2-part problem: (1) filing unfair labor practice charges and (2) filing
decertification petitions.
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refrain from the exercise of concerted activities. 7 Section 8(b)(1)(A)
implemented this policy by providing as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to
restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
7: Provided, That this paragraphshall not impair the right of a labor organization
to prescribeits own rules with respect to the acquisitionor retention of membership
therein. ....
.

The major purpose of section 8(b)(1)(A) was to prohibit violence, and

job discrimination 0 in union attempts to organize non-union workers."
With the enactment of the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A), however,
Congress manifested a clear intent to allow unions to regulate "the
'2
acquisition or retention of [union] membership."'

The scope of the proviso was soon litigated, and the Seventh Circuit

found that it enabled a union to expel or suspend union members.'

3

Subsequently, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.," the NLRB

concluded that a union could impose a fine on a member for his failure
to participate in concerted activities without violating section 8(b)(l)(A).
The Board reasoned that the proviso precluded any such interference
with the internal affairs of a labor organization. 5 Several cases,
however, held that any union discipline precipitating employer
discrimination against one of its members violated section 8(b)(1)(A). 6
In these instances, the union discipline affected the member's status as
an employee, not merely as a member. The judicial capstone of this era
7. Ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (Supp. 1, 1935).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964) (emphasis added).
9. See, e.g., Lane v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1951) (union agent threatening
nonmembers with violence held coercive).
10. See, e.g., NLRB v. Newspaper Deliverers' Union, 192 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1951), enforcing
86 N.L.R.B. 951 (1949) (union pressuring publisher to assign work to union members held
coercive).
11. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 186 (1967).
12. Senator Taft (R-Ohio) predicted that § 8(b)(l)(A) would have little effect on a union's
authority over its members: "The pending measure does not propose any limitation with respect to
the internal affairs of unions. They still will be able to fine any members they wish to fine, and they
still will be able to try any of their members. All that they will not be able to do, after the enactment
of this bill, is this: If they fine a member for some reason other than nonpayment of dues, they
cannot make his employer discharge him from his job and throw him out of work." 93 CONG. REc.
4193 (1947).
13. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), affd on
othergrounds, 345 U.S. 100 (1953).
14. 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
15. Id.at 729.
16. See, e.g., Printz Leather Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1312 (1951). See generally Union Starch &

Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951). When a valid union
shop exists, however, a union may lawfully request the employer to discharge a member for
nonpayment of dues or initiation fees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(b)(2) (1964).
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came in 1958 when the Supreme Court expressly recognized the union's
authority to discipline its members and indicated that federal law had
7
not entered the area of internal union affairs.'
This void was partially filled by Congress in 1959 with the
enactment of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(Landrum-Griffin Act),' 8 which was the first legislative attempt to
regulate the internal affairs of unions. Relative to union discipline,
section 101 (a)(4) of the Act provided:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or
otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any
officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges;
(B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair
hearing."

The safeguards provided in the Landrum-Griffin Act, 20 however, do not
provide substantive standards to measure the scope of permissible union
discipline. Consequently, the problem of the valid exercise of union
discipline was not solved by the 1959 amendments.
B. Scofield Appears on the Scene
The policy questions involved in an evaluation of union discipline
under the coverage of section 8(b)(1)(A) were considered in the context
of union production quotas in Scofield v. NLRB. 2' The case involved the
imposition of production quotas on 50 percent of the production
employees of the Wisconsin Motor Company, who were compensated on
a piecework basis. Since 1938, the union had unilaterally imposed a
production ceiling on its members, which was enforced by fines or
expulsion. If a union member produced more than the ceiling, the
company "banked" the over-production and paid it to the employee for
days he did not reach the ceiling. After a random check, the union
17. Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). "ITihe protection of union members in
their rights as members from arbitrary conduct by unions and union officers has not been
undertaken by federal law, and indeed the assertion of any such power has been expressly denied."
Id. at 620.
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964). See Etelson &Smith, note 4 supra.
19. 29 U.S.C, § 411 (a)(5) (1964) (emphasis added).
20. The Landrum-Griffin safeguards for employees have been capsulized by Professor Cox
and Dean Bok: "Certain provisions required that elections be held periodically for local and
national union officers and that union members be assured a right to vote, to nominate candidates,
to run for office, to comment upon candidates for union office, etc. Every union member was given
an equal right to attend membership meetings and to participate in the voting and deliberations at
such meetings." A. Cox & D. BOK, CASES ON LABOR LAW 136-37 (6th ed. 1965).

21. Local 283, UAW, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964), affdsub nor. Scofield v. NLRB, 393 F.2d
49 (7th Cir. 1968), affd, 394 U.S. 423 (1969) (commonly referred to as Scofield).
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discovered that Scofield, as well as other union members, had exceeded
the ceiling. The members were fined 50 to 100 dollars and suspended for
a year. Scofield refused to pay the fine, and the union brought suit in
state court to collect the debt. Scofield responded by filing an unfair
labor practice charge, alleging a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A). 2
In his examination of the charge, the Trial Examiner addressed
himself to the issue of whether the union, "in assessing fines on certain of
its members . . . for exceeding certain production ceilings established
under a rule of the Union, and in thereafter instituting civil suit in a State
court to collect them, violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act."23The Trial
Examiner first analyzed the scope of the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso and
concluded that the controlling doctrine was represented by American
Newspaper Publishers Association4 and Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co.?5 These two cases stand for the proposition that not all coercive
union activity violates section 8(b)(1)(A). The proviso protects expulsion
or the imposition of fines as methods to enforce a union's internal rules,26
however, the proviso's immunity is lost when a union attempts to enforce
a rule that does not pertain to membership status.2Y
After reviewing the controlling authority as to the scope of the
proviso, the Trial Examiner examined the effect of the union's
disciplinary action upon Scofield's status as an employee and as a union
member. He concluded that as an employee, Scofield was free not only
to ignore the production ceiling rule but also to refuse to pay the
resulting fine.2 As a member, however, he was subject to the union
production ceiling since the NLRB did not regulate the incidents of the
union-member relationship.2 9 The Trial Examiner concluded that if the
discipline relates to internal union affairs, it is valid, but if it affects the
member's status as an employee, it is invalid.3 The NLRB affirmed the
22. The facts of the Scofield case were taken from the Supreme Court's opinion reported in
Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
23. Local 283, UAW, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1112 (1964).
24. 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), affd, 345 U.S. 100 (1953). See note 13 supra and
accompanying text.
25. 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954). See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
26. 145 N.L.R.B. at 1113-14.
27. Id. at 1114.
28. Id. at 1124. It is interesting to note the Trial Examiner's language in discussing the Act:
"The result . . . as the Supreme Court put it in the Radio Officers' case, is to 'insulate the
employee's job from his organization rights' by leaving him free as an employee to be a 'good, bad,
or indifferent' member subject only to his obligations under a union-security contract to tender the
requisite dues and initiation fees." Id.; see Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
29. 145 N.L.R.B. at 1124.
30. Id. at 1134.
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Trial Examiner's findings and acknowledged that the legislative intent
behind section 8(b)(1)(A) was to protect employees from union as well as
employer duress.3' It then found that Congress did not authorize the
Board to review union penalties imposed on members when the penalties
did not impair a member's status as an employee, 32 and concluded that
the union discipline related to Scofield only in his role as a union
member. The practical effect of this decision is to allow unions, under
the protection of the 8(b)(1)(A) proviso, to coerce their own members so
long as the coercion relates to the acquisition or retention of
membership.Y One Board member dissented, reasoning that the Board's
decision could be used to convert any requirement relating to
employment into an internal union affair merely by passing a by-law
making the requirement a condition for membership.3 Looking to the
nature of production quotas, the dissent concluded that the union was
regulating production and wages, which were clearly related to
employment and not to union membership.3
C. Subsequent Case Development: 1964-1969
A situation similar to the one in Scofield was presented in 1965 in
Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. NLRB,36 but a different result was
reached. The union had unilaterally imposed fines for exceeding
production standards. If a member committed an infraction, the union
would apply his dues to payment of the fine3 7 rather than institute court
proceedings. The Board held that the practice of applying dues payments
to fines was an 8(b)(1)(A) violation, but that the fines themselves were
permissible under the section.3 8 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
circumvented the issue and held that the union violated section 8(b)(3), 31
which requires the union to bargain with the employer about terms and
31.
32.

Id. at I100.

Id. at 1104.

37 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 847 (1968); see Note, Union DisciplinaryPower and Section
8(b)(l)[A) of the National Labor Relations Act: Limitations on the Immunity Doctrine, 41
N.Y.U.L. REv. 584, 588 (1966).
34. 145 N.L.R.B. at 1112 (Leedom, dissenting).
35. Id. at I111.
36. 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965).
37. The union had negotiated and was operating under a union shop contract. Brief for
Appellant at 3, Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745
33.

(9th Cir. 1965). Therefore, if the fined members failed to pay both dues and fines, their jobs would
be endangered. Note, 8(b)(I)(A) Limitations Upon the Right of a Union to Fine Its Members, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 47, 76 (1966).
38. 352 F.2d at 747.

39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1964).
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conditions of employment, since it had unilaterally established the

production ceilings.4 0 Consequently, the finding of an unfair labor
practice was based on the union's violation of its good faith bargaining
duty by unilaterally imposing the production ceiling.
The significant decision of NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co., 41 although not a production quota case, provides a
useful example of the Supreme Court's interpretation of section
8(b)(1)(A). The issue before the Court was "whether a union which...
imposed fines [20 to 100 dollars], and brought suit for their collection,
against members who crossed the union's picket line and went to work

during an authorized strike against their employer, commited [an
8(b)(1)(A) violation]. '42 The Court concluded that the expulsions for
nonpayment of fines were not unfair labor practices, since the proviso to
8(b)(l)(A) preserved the union's right to impose fines, and that by
implication the right of expulsion was available as a means of discipline
for nonpayment. The majority found that the legislative history did not

show a design to limit the union's authority to discipline its members for
matters involving internal affairs.4 3 Four dissenting Justices, however,
indicated that the underlying reason behind the majority's holding was
the protection of weak unions. According to the dissent, the power of
expulsion alone is not enough for a weak union to keep its members from
challenging it; the power to impose enforceable fines on strikebreaking
44
members also is needed.
40. "The rules relating to the limitation of production are plainly rules adopted for the
purpose of establishing the terms and conditions of employment of union members. The rule is not
directed merely to the employees; it has a direct impact on the employer. It fixes the conditions and
terms under which he procures the services of his employees." 352 F.2d at 750.
41. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
42. Id. at 176.
43. Congress intended to impose only one limitation on the union's powers over its internal
affairs: a union could not enforce internal regulations that affect a member's status as an employee.
Id. at 185. The NLRB, in its determination of the case, had reached a similar conclusion. Local 248,
UAW, 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964), rev'd sub nom. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656
(7th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 388 U.S. 175 (1967). The NLRB, attempting to clarify Scofield, formulated a
test for reviewing union discipline as follows: "[W]hether, in enforcing the rule, the union goes
outside the area of union-member relationship and enters the area of employer-employee
relationship." 149 N.L.R.B. at 70.
44. 388 U.S. at 204 (Black, Douglas, Harlan, & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). Justice Black, in
dissent, noted that "[lust because a union might be free, under the proviso, to expel a member for
crossing a picket line does not mean that Congress left unions free to threaten their members with
fines." 388 U.S. at 203.
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D. Scofield Reaches the Supreme Court
45
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the Scofield case
after the Board's decision had been enforced by the Seventh Circuit."
Justice White, writing for the majority, adopted the interpretation of
section 8(b)(1)(A) as articulated in Allis-Chalmers and Minneapolis
Star & Tribune. The Court, therefore, distinguished valid internal
enforcement of union discipline from invalid external enforcement.4 7 The
majority reasoned that this interpretation of section 8(b)(1)(A) was
reinforced by the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.48 Notwithstanding this
conclusion, the Court recognized that in certain instances 4 a union may
not enforce a rule that "invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the
labor laws."' Thus, the internal-external distinction must be qualified
by public policy considerations. The Court formulated the test as
follows:
Under this dual approach, section 8(b)(l)(A) leaves a union free to enforce a
properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy
Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union
members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule.51

Applying this test to the facts, the Court concluded that the union did
not violate section 8(b)(1)(A) by enforcement of its production ceiling.
II.
A.

FILING WITH THE NLRB
The TraditionalRule

Recognizing the power of unions to regulate their internal affairs,
the NLRB, in an early series of administrative rulings, held that union
discipline of a member for filing charges with the Board before
45. The NLRB contended that the petition for certiorari was not timely filed. The Supreme
Court rejected this position. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423,427 (1969). See Brief for Petitioner at
26-31.
46. Scofield v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1968). For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's
decision see 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 845 (1968).
47. Justice White emphasized that "[a]s an employee, he may be a 'good, bad, or indifferent'
member so long as he meets the financial obligations of the union-security contract." 394 U.S. at
429 n.5. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,40 (1954).
48. "[A]lthough [the Landrum-Griffin Act] dealt with the internal affairs of unions,
including the procedures for imposing fines or expulsion, [it] did not purport to overturn or modify
the Board's interpretation of 8(b)(l)(A)." 394 U.S. at 429.
49. For example, Local 138, Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964) (commonly referred
to as Skura), involved a union rule requiring the exhaustion of intra-union remedies before filing an
unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.
50. 394 U.S. at 429. In all likelihood, this quoted language will be a touchstone for future
decisions.
51. 394 U.S. at 430.
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exhausting union remedies was not a violation of the NLRA. 2 In 1959,
Congress codified these rulings in section 101(a)(4) of the LandrumGriffin Act,5 3 but qualified the traditional rule with a controversial

proviso. Stated simply, this section prohibits unions from restricting a
member's access to a court or administrative agency, but allows them to
require members to exhaust reasonable union procedures before

commencing legal or administrative proceedings. The proviso has
generated voluminous comment- because it can be interpreted as either a
restraint upon the judiciary or upon the unions. 5 Not surprisingly, early
case law was divided on this point. One group of decisions accepted the

union's contention that the proviso limited judicial intervention and
granted the unions power to discipline members who failed to exhaust
union appellate procedures."6 These cases emphasized the statutory

recognition of the union's interest in maintaining control over its
internal affairs.5 7 The second line of cases espoused the view that the

proviso acted as a restraint on the union by conferring discretionary
power on the agency or court to dismiss the action until the member had

exhausted union procedures." This view underscores the protection of
the employee's right to file charges against his employer or his union.
52. NLRB Gen. Counsel Admin. Ruling, Case No. K-103, 37 L.R.R.M. 1103 (Nov. 3, 1955)
(permitting fine without first exhausting union remedies); NLRB Gen. Counsel Admin. Ruling,
Case No. 1059, 35 L.R.R.M. 1167 (Nov. 19, 1954) (permitting suspension of a member for filing an
unfair labor practice charge).
53. "No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action
in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency . . . Provided, That any such
member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month
lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative
proceedings ...
" 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(4) (1964).
54. E.g., Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and
Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MicH. L. REV. 1435, 1455-63 (1963); Cox,
Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819,
839-41 (1960); O'Donoghue, Protection of a Union Member's Right to Sue Under the LandrumGriffin Act, 14 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 215 (1965); Thatcher, Rights of Individual Union Members
Under Title I andSection 610 of the Landrum-GriffinAct, 52 GEO. L.J. 339, 350-55 (1964).
55. For an interesting and extensive discussion of the 2 views see O'Donoghue, supra note 54.
56. Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626,306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962); Detroy v. American Guild
of Variety Artists, 189 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 929 (1961).
57. Cf. Local 283, UAW, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1100 (1964) (internal union disciplines not
among the restraints intended to be encompassed by § 8(b)(1)(A)).
58. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,366 U.S.
929 (1961). See, e.g., Ryan v. Electrical Workers Local 134, 361 F.2d 942 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 935 (1966); Deluhery v. Cooks Union, 211 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
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B.

Filingan Unfair Labor PracticeCharge with the NLRB

1. The Skura Case.-The dispute over the proper interpretation of
the proviso to section 101 (a)(4) as it relates to the filing of unfair labor
practice charges was resolved in a 1964 decision. 59 The case arose
because Charles Skura was dissatisfied with his union and joined a union
reform group. In furtherance of the group's objectives, he filed an unfair
labor practice charge against the union. The Regional Director decided
not to issue a complaint, and Skura withdrew the charge. The union,
relying upon its internal procedures, levied a fine on Skura for not
exhausting intra-union remedies before filing a charge with the NLRB.
After the union refused Skura's offer to pay his dues until he discharged
his outstanding fine, Skura then filed another unfair labor practice
charge. The NLRB overruled its prior administrative position and held
that the union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) when it fined Skura." This
drastic departure from its prior rulings had the effect of enabling a union
member to file with the Board before exhausting normal union remedies.
The union had advocated two contentions to support its position: (1) the
fine was an internal union matter that was protected by the union
discipline proviso; and (2) the union could require exhaustion of union
remedies under the proviso to section 101 (a)(4) of the Landrum-Griffin
Act. 61 The Board rejected the first contention by noting that union
discipline of a member who files with the NLRB before exhausting
union remedies cannot be considered an internal union matter. Rather,
the justification for administrative protection of the member can be
found in the public policy favoring free access to the Board. 1 The
union's second contention was rejected through a restrictive
interpretation of Landrum-Griffin's section 101(a)(4) proviso. The
NLRB concluded that union members "may be required" to exhaust
union remedies and that the "courts, not the union, were vested with the
power to require exhaustion."'' Significantly, the NLRB reached its
decision without the support of analogous case law. 4 Instead of
reasoning from precedent, it balanced section 7 and section 8(b)(1)(A)
59. Local 138, Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964) (commonly referred to as Skura).
60. Id. The Board reached the same conclusion in a companion case, H.B. Roberts, 148
N.L.R.B. 674 (1964), affdsub nom. Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In Roberts
the appellate court concluded that the § 8(b)(l)(A) provision did not protect the union discipline
since the imposition of the fine was "too remote from a rule with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership to be protected by the mere language of the proviso." 350 F.2d at 428 n.2.
61. 148 N.L.R.B. at 681.
62. See Note, supra note 33, at 590.
63. See 1969 UTAH L. Rav. 140, 145.
64. See Note, supra note 33, at 591.
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rights. The Board was not confined by the union's definition of its
internal affairs, but looked to the nature and objective of the union rule,
5
as compared with the public interest.
2. Marine Workers: The Issue Reaches the Supreme
Court.-Although strengthened by a series of administrative decisions,"
the NLRB's position in Skura was not reviewed by the Supreme Court
until 1968, when the case of NLRB v. Marine Workers 7 presented the
Court with facts substantially similar to those in Skura. Once again the
union had expelled a member for filing unfair labor practice charges
before exhausting intra-union remedies. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit upheld the union's disciplinary action, 8 but the Supreme
Court reversed. Relying upon Skura, the Court held that union discipline
limiting access to the NLRB violated section 8(b)(1)(A). Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, reaffirmed the two reasons underlying
the Skura decision: (1) the proviso to section 101 (a)(4) of the LandrumGriffin Act gives discretionary power to the courts and not the unions;
and (2) the public policy protecting free access to the NLRB makes
union discipline for filing charges external to the normal union affairs.70
Furthermore, the Court indicated that if the union's position were
upheld, the rights of members who object to noninternal matters would
71
be coerced.
Two interesting facets of the Marine Workers decision should be
noted. First, the Court in dictum indicated that the public policy
argument overrides the proviso to section 8(b)(l)(A) only when the
nature of the complaint touches on matters outside the internal workings
of the union. The Court reasoned, however, that a complaint implicating
the employer was sufficient to extend the cause of action beyond the
internal affairs of the union. 72 Secondly, Justice Harlan, in a concurring
opinion, rejected this dictum and expressly stated that a union cannot
65. See 1969 UTAH L. REv. 140, 145.
66. Cannery Workers Union, 159 N.L.R.B. 843 (1966), enforced, 396 F.2d 955 (9th Cir.
1968); Typographical Union, 158 N.L.R.B. 1018 (1966); Local 238, Lathers, 156 N.L.R.B. 997
(1966).
67. 391 U.S. 418 (1968). See 1969 UTAH L. Rv. 140.
68. Local 22, Marine Workers v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 702 (3d Cir. 1967). The circuit court
concluded that a union has the right to correct its own errors before the member should have a right
of access to the Board. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision see 21 VAND. L. REV. 157
(1967).
69. NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418,428 (1968).

70.

Id. at 424.

71. Id. at 425, 428; see Comment, The Union Fine as a Disciplinary Measure: A
Means-End Analysis, 6 HOUSTON L. Rev. 792, 806 (1969).
72. 391 U.S. at425.
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discipline a member who files before exhausting union remedies even
though the complaint is not a matter of public interest.73 This reasoning
explicitly rejects the normal internal-external distinction.
Two commentators have suggested that the basis for the holding in
Marine Workers was that the employer, as well as the union, was
involved in the complaining member's unfair labor practice charge.7 4
Consequently, the internal union remedies would not have adequately
protected the rights of the parties. One critic of the Skura and Marine
Workers holdings has noted that the effect of these decisions will be to
encourage distrust of union hearings. 75 In any event, it seems that the
Supreme Court will in the future protect a member's access to the
NLRB to the detriment of the union's power to require completion of
internal remedies.
C.

Filinga DecertificationPetition with the NLR B

1. A Rule is Formed: The Tawas Case.-Section 9(c)(1)(A)(ii) of
the NLRA gives union members, among others, the right to file a
decertification petition. 76 The policy behind this section is that a union
member has the right to challenge the very status of the union as the
bargaining representative. Consequently, the Board reached an early
conclusion that members had the right to protest and question union
policies.7 The Board's position on the conflict between this policy and
the policy favoring union discipline, however, was not crystallized until
the Tawas Tube Products,Inc. decision.78 In that case, a union member
filed an unfair labor practice charge against the union, alleging a
violation of section 8(b)(1)(A), after he was expelled from the union for
filing a decertification petition with the NLRB. Rejecting the Acting
Regional Director's contention that the Skura decision was controlling,
the Board found no violation since the union action was protected by the
union discipline proviso.7 1 The Board raised two points to justify its
conclusion. First, the disciplinary action involved the charging party's
73. Id. at 429; see Comment, supra note 71, at 806.
74. Etelson &Smith, supra note 4, at 760.
75. Kroner, Title I of the LMRDA: Some Problems of Legal Method and Mythology, 43
N.Y.U.L. REv. 280, 301-03 (1968).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1964). This section empowers the Board to conduct
elections to decertify incumbent bargaining agents, which have been previously certified, when an
employee or other designated individual files a decertification petition with the NLRB.
77. Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 75 (1950), enforced, 189 F.2d 756 (3d Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
78. 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965); see Note, supra note 33, at 592-94.
79. 151 N.L.R.B. at 47; see notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
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status as a member and not as an employee.80 Secondly, the proviso
permits a union to expel members who attack the union's very existence
through the decertification procedure.8 1 The Skura decision was
therefore distinguishable, because in that case the Board had sought only
to protect the member's access to the NLRB for prompt redress of union
infringement of section 7 rights. In Tawas, however, union members
resorted to the Board "for the purpose of attacking the very existence of
82
their union rather than as an effort to compel it to abide by the Act. 1
Another possible basis for distinction is that Skura involved a fine and
Tawas involved expulsion.n
The Board was faced with a situation similar to Tawas in Richard
C. Price,8 and again, the General Counsel relied upon the strict Skura
interpretation of the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso. The Board, however,
applied Tawas in finding no violation and reaffirmed the distinction
between filing unfair labor charges and decertification petitions. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed itself to the question of the extent of
the proviso's protection as it relates to union discipline for filing a
decertification petition. The court held that the union's expulsion of
Price was not a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A) 8' since he was attacking
the union's very existence as a bargaining agent, rather than accusing it
of violating the law.87
2. The DistinctionIs Refined: The Blackhawk Tanning Case.-In
Blackhawk Tanning Co., 88 the union member belonged to a "financial
core" of the union. Although she did not assume the responsibilities of
full membership, she paid her dues and initiation fee as required under
the union-security contract. After circulating a decertification petition,
she was fined by the union; subsequently, she filed an unfair labor
practice charge, alleging a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A). In its decision,
the NLRB explicitly recognized the problem of reconciling the policy
protecting access to the Board with the union's right to discipline under
the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso.8" The Board noted that while a union may
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,40 (1954); 151 N.L.R.B. at 47-48.
151 N.L.R.B. at 47-48.
Id. at 48.
Note, supra note 33, at 593.
154 N.L.R.B. 692 (1965).
Id. at 696.
Price v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 904 (1968).
Id. at 447.
1969 CCH NLRB Dec. 27,005.
Id. at 27,006.
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not fine or expel a member for filing an unfair labor practice charge," it
may expel a member who has filed a decertification petition. 91 The union
discipline involved in this case, however, was not expulsion but
imposition of a fine. Therefore, the issue was whether the Board should
uphold the union's right to fine as well as expel a member who files or
circulates a decertification petition. Contrary to the precedent of Tawas
and Price, the NLRB held that the union violated section 8(b)(1)(A) for
fining a member under these circumstances.
In Tawas and Price,the underlying general principle was that union
discipline was protected by the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) and that
Skura represented a narrow exception. 9 2 In Blackhawk Tanning,
however, it was noted that the "rule permitting a union to expel a
member seeking decertification is an exception to the rule prohibiting a
union from penalizing a member because he has sought to invoke the
Board's processes." 3 A significant basis to the Blackhawk Tanning
decision is the fact that the punitive effect of expulsion is minimal, while
a fine for filing a decertification petition is necessarily punitive. The
Board's precise language should be noted:
In short, where the union member is seeking to decertify the union, the Board has
said that the public policy against permitting a union to penalize a member because
he seeks the aid of the Board should give way to the union's right of self-defense. But
when a union only fines a member because he has filed a decertification petition, the
effect cannot be defensive and can only be punitive-to discourage members from
seeking the Board's processes; the union is not one whit better able to defend itself
against the decertification as a result of the fine. The dissident member could still
campaign against the union while remaining a member and therefore be privy to its
strategy and tactics.9

Clearly, the Board reached the conclusion that expulsion and fining are
"qualitatively different;" therefore, fining but not expulsion is a
violation of the Act. The dissenting members of the Board could not
distinguish fining and expulsion. They would have held that in order to
protect itself from attacks upon its existence, a union has the right to fine
90. E.g., NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968); Local 138,
Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964). See notes 65-71 supra and accompanying text.
91. E.g., Local 4028, United Steelworkers, 154 N.L.R.B. 692 (1965), petition to review
denied, 373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 904 (1968); Tawas Tube Prods., Inc.,
151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965).
92. See Local 4028, United Steelworkers, 154 N.L.R.B. 692 (1965),petition to review denied,
373 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 904 (1968).
93. Molders, Local 125, 1969 CCH NLRB Dec. 27,005 (commonly cited as Blackhawk
Tanning Co.).
94. Id. at 27,007.
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members who file decertification petitions.9 5 The dissenting members
found justification for their position in the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A).

III.

THiE RIGHT

A.

To BE A DISSIDENT MEMBER
Does It Exist?

By joining a union, an employee does not waive his section 7 rights,
which permit him to refrain from any or all concerted activities carried
on by the union. 9 It is clear that a member can enforce his right to be
free of union coercion through section 8(b)(1)(A), but this right is
qualified to the extent of the union's power to regulate its internal affairs
under the proviso to that section.97 This has been amply demonstrated by
the production quota cases and the decertification cases. Thus the union,
in order to be an effective bargaining agent, can marshal its strength
through coercive discipline. Despite this power, a union cannot mete out
discipline that has the effect of violating a public labor policy. When this
occurs, the Board will protect a member's access to the administrative
process, even though internal union procedures provide additional
remedies. The Marine Workers decision provides a graphic example.
An examination of the cases has indicated that at the present time
there is no affirmative right to be a recalcitrant union member. Rather,
the union is able to exact member obedience through coercive discipline
subject only to a public policy exception involving the protection of a
member's access to the NLRB. The Blackhawk Tanning case,"
however, may mark a significant departure from this doctrine. By
finding that a union violated the NLRA by fining a member who
circulated a decertification petition, the NLRB may have formulated a
second exception. The decision is a retreat to some degree from the
NLRB's position in Tawas, in which the Board found that the union
could take action to protect itself from a member who filed a
decertification petition, thereby attacking the union's status as a
bargaining representative. It is significant that in Blackhawk Tanning
the Board carefully examined the union's motives for levying a fine
against its member. The result was that the Board clearly stated that
95. "[B]y permitting a union to suspend, expel or assess a reasonable fine on union members
for decertification activities antithetical to the very existence of the Union, we would be giving
proper weight and recognition to the Union's right to discipline its members where its very existence
is threatened, a right clearly granted to it by Congress when it added the proviso to Section
8(b)(I)(A)." Id. at 27,009 (Fanning &Jenkins, dissenting).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
97. See Comment, supra note 71, at 794.
98. See notes 92-97 supra and accompanying text.
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fining a member for circulating a decertification petition is solely a
punitive measure." Therefore, the union unlawfully coerced the member
in his exercise of section 7 rights and was not protected by the section
8(b)(1)(A) proviso.
The hope that the Board will respond more favorably in the future
to an argument based on the right to be a bad union member is
supported by an unarticulated policy that may underlie the Blackhawk
Tanning decision. This policy makes it unlawful for a union to cause a
member to be discharged from his employment. 10 Since the union in
Blackhawk Tanning was operating under a union-security agreement,
expulsion from the union would have resulted in the dismissal of the
employee by his employer. Consequently, the only valid disciplinary
measure the union could have taken against the member was a fine. By
its holding that a fine violated the NLRA under those circumstances, the
Board has destroyed the normal types of union discipline for circulating
or filing a decertification petition when the union is operating under a
union-security contract. In this situation, a union may neither fine nor
expel a member. Thus, in this limited area, a member may act with
impunity to subvert the union's authority.
Since the right to be a recalcitrant union member is both untested
and untried in the judicial or administrative process, it is impossible to
reach a convincing conclusion that an affirmative right exists.
Blackhawk Tanning, however, may prove to be the harbinger of this
development.
B.

Should It Exist?

One commentator 1m recently suggested that the proviso to section
8(b)(1)(A) should be interpreted to permit substantive union discipline
concerning internal matters. 0 ' According to his theory, the controlling
principle should be as follows:
Statutory freedom in internal union regulation generally exempts union discipline
99. The Board reasoned that expulsion of the dissident member has a defensive nature since
the member would no longer be privy to the union's strategy. On the other hand, merely fining the
member permitted him to campaign against the union while remaining a member. Thus, since the
fine had no defensive merit, it was punitive. Blackhawk Tanning Co., 1969 CCH NLRB Dec.
27,005.
100. NLRB v. Painters Local 419, 242 F.2d 477, 481 (10th Cir. 1967); Printz Leather Co.,
Inc., 94 N.L.R.B. 1312, 1315 (1951).
101. The authority is John Silard, who argued before the Supreme Court on behalf of the
union in Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969) and NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
175 (1967).
102. See Silard, Labor Board Regulation of Union DisciplineAfter Allis-Chalmers, Marine
Workers and Scofield, GEO. WASH. L. REv. 187 (1969).
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from Board intrusion unless the member would be required to transgress rights of
others which the statute protects.'0

Additionally, this commentator concluded that the NLRB should be a
mediary, avoiding regulation of both the union's and employer's internal
prerogatives. 1 4 In opposition to this view, a recent editorial in the Wall
Street Journal argued that the union's disciplinary control should be
limited. 0 5 It theorized that the need for strengthening the union's
disciplinary procedures, and therefore its position at the bargaining
table, appears to be waning in light of the advantageous collective
bargaining agreements recently secured by many of the large unions. The
editorial also proposed that the protection of the member's section 7
rights vis a vis the union should be both reexamined and reaffirmed.
On balance, it seems that in order to insure fairness to union
members, either the Congress or the courts should recognize the right
to be a recalcitrant union member. This right simply entails an
examination of two factors: (1) "the necessity of the result sought by the
discipline for the furtherance of union goals;" and (2) "the means
through which the union alleges accession to that member's right."IH0
The judicial or administrative body should determine the extent to which
a member's section 7 rights have been violated, and any injury that is so
great as to negate union justification must result in a finding in favor of
the member. If the NLRB is not up to this task, then Congress should
07
take the initiative.
NEIL
103. Id. at 196.
104. See id. at 198.
105. WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 6, 1970, at 8,cols. 1-2 (Eastern Ed.).
106. Note, supra note 33, at 594-601.
107. WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 6, 1970, at 8, cols. 1-2 (Eastern Ed.).
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